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Introduction 
As an industry, higher education shows some striking anomalies. 
It is the only important industry in the United States that has been 
increasingly socialized in recent decades: the market share of public 
institutions grew, roughly, from 50 percent to 80 percent over the last 
half of the twentieth century.1 Now the industry is suddenly heading 
down a very different path, with the market share of proprietary 
institutions- which was negligible thirty-five years ago- presently in 
excess of 10 percent.2 Such contradictory developments bring into 
question the future economic organization of higher education and 
the forms of financing and regulation that might be appropriate to it. 
I'll offer here some speculation in that direction, focusing just on 
several of the main structural features of the industry and, of 
necessity, addressing them at a very general level. And I'll compare 
the evolution of higher education with the evolution of health care, 
seeking the reasons for both similarities and differences. The general 
conclusion I offer, perhaps unsurprising in the current political and 
economic climate, is that market forces are likely to play a much 
larger role in higher education in the future than they have in the 
past, and a larger role than they play in health care as well. 
t Oscar M. Ruebhausen Professor fLaw, Yale Law School. 
Prepared for the Understanding Education in the United States: Its Legal and Social 
Implications Symposium held at the University of Chicago Law School on June 17 and 18, 
2011. I am grateful to participants in that conference for helpful comments and to Gabrielle 
Holburt, Alice Hwang, Yuan Ji, Christine Ku, Jimmy Li, and Julie Wang for research 
assistance. I am also grateful to the University of Chicago Law Review for excellent editorial 
assistance. 
1 Compare US Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2004-2005 169, 
online at http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/04statab/educ.pdf (vi ited Oct 25, 2011),with 
US Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1953 125, online at 
http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/1953-02.pdf (visited Oct 25, 2011). 2 See Kelly Field, For-Profit Colleges Win Major Concessions i  Final ' Gainful Employment ' 
Rule , Chron Higher Ed (June 2, 2011), online at http://chronicle.com/article/For-Profit-Colleges- 
Win-Maj or/1 27744/ (visited Oct 25, 2011). 
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I. What Kind of a Good Is Higher Education? 
It is often said- particularly in support of public subsidies- that 
higher education is a public good that benefits society as a whole.3 
This seems a difficult conclusion to support, however. The 
overwhelming bulk of the returns to an education surely accrue to 
the individual who receives it, whether we look at its consumption- 
good aspects (such as learning for its own pleasures, socializing, or 
playing sports) or its production-good aspects (such as acquiring 
skills and contacts that will increase one's expected earning power). 
While there are surely some external benefits when an individual 
gets a good education, the ratio of social to private benefits is 
arguably not much different than when an individual builds a house 
or buys a truck. 
There is another respect, however, in which education- and 
higher education in particular- is rather different from most 
ordinary goods and services. It is- particularly at the higher end of 
the market- an "associative good," in the sense that the value that a 
customer derives from patronizing a given producer is highly 
dependent upon the personal qualities of the producer's other 
customers.4 The attraction of attending Harvard College, for 
example, derives not just- or perhaps even principally- from the 
quality of the teaching that Harvard offers but also in important 
measure from the intelligence, motivation, prior education, athletic 
ability, family, and social connections of Harvard's other students. In 
substantial part, Harvard is selling its students to each other. 
Markets for associative goods behave differently from other 
markets. For one thing, they tend to be selective with regard to their 
customers and to stratify, with the highest-quality tranche of 
customers patronizing one producer, the second-highest-quality 
tranche patronizing a second producer, and so on down the scale of 
quality.5 For another, producers of associative goods have an 
incentive to be smaller in scale than they would be absent the 
associative character of their goods, and to respond to increased 
3 See, for example, Jonathan D. Glater, The Other Big Test: Why Congress Should 
Allow College Students oBorrow More through Federal Aid Programs, 14 NYU J Leg & Pub 
Pol 11, 13 (2011). 4 See Henry Hansmann, The Ownership of Enterprise 185-94 (Belknap 1996). 
5 See Henry Hansmann, A Theory of Status Organizations , 2 J L, Econ, & Org 119, 120, 
122-23, 129 (1986). 
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demand by increasing the minimum quality they require of their 
customers rather than increasing the quantity they produce.6 
II. Financing and Ownership 
Whether pursued as an aid to consumption or to production, 
higher education requires a substantial investment at the beginning 
of one's adult life, in the form of both direct expense and forgone 
earnings, while the returns from that investment are likely to be 
spread out over many subsequent decades. Students who don't come 
from wealthy families therefore need third-party financing to cover 
the initial cost. But it is difficult for students to bond themselves 
credibly to repay educational loans, since human capital provides 
poor security. Higher education is also an investment with much 
higher personal risk than social risk, since its return to any particular 
individual is hard to predict. For both these reasons, unsubsidized 
loans obtained on the private market are commonly insufficient to 
finance an efficient level of higher education. Much of the evolution 
in the institutions providing American higher education since the 
colonial days can be seen as an effort to arrange other sources of 
financing.7 
A. Supply-Side Private Donations 
Many private colleges and universities were, of course, founded 
or sustained in their early years by gifts from otherwise unrelated 
benefactors, such as the eponymous Harvard and Yale. 
Philanthropic contributions from third parties such as these have 
continued, but today are substantially overshadowed by donations 
from the institutions' own graduates, which are frequently an 
important source of revenue.8 
Why do graduates give to their alma mater- rather than, for 
example, giving to other colleges and universities that might have 
greater need for the funds? From an economic point of view, the 
arrangement has much of the character of an implicit loan program. 
Colleges charge many or all of their students less than the full cost of 
their education, with the understanding that the tuition discount 
represents, in effect, a loan from the college that the student is 
6 See Hansmann, The Ownership ofEnterprise at 185-90 (cited in note 4). See also 
Hansmann, 2 J L, Econ, & Org at 120, 123-25, 129 (cited in note 5). 7 See generally Daniel A. Wren, American Business Philanthropy and Higher Education 
in the Nineteenth Century , 57 Bus Hist Rev 321 (1983). 8 See James Monks, Patterns of Giving to One's Alma Mater among Young Graduates 
from Selective Institutions , 22 Econ Educ Rev 121, 121 (2003). 
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expected to repay by making donations proportionate to their 
subsequent financial fortune in life. This arrangement has important 
efficiencies, not only in supplying credit where it would otherwise be 
unavailable but also in providing an important element of risk 
sharing. 
A norms-based implicit loan program of this sort works quite 
effectively for many well-established elite institutions such as 
Harvard, Yale, and Princeton. But this form of financing is clearly 
inadequate for newer or less prestigious institutions, which 
frequently lack a large cadre of grateful graduates. Efforts to make 
such contingent loan programs explicitly contractual rather than 
merely implicit, which were tried out with high expectations several 
decades ago, have collapsed owing to adverse selection.9 
Whether private donations come from third-party benefactors 
or from an institution's own graduates, any private college or 
university that relies upon them must, as a practical matter, be 
organized as a nonprofit entity. The nondistribution constraint that 
characterizes a nonprofit provides an important degree of assurance 
to donors that the benefit of their contributions will be passed 
through to the institution's students, rather than simply being 
appropriated by those who control the organization. This surely goes 
far in explaining the large role historically played by nonprofit 
institutions in higher education in the United States.1" 
B. Supply-Side Governmental Subsidies 
As the demand for higher education has expanded, private 
philanthropy has become increasingly inadequate as a solution to the 
problem of financing a college education, and it has been even less 
successful in financing graduate education in the arts and sciences. 
The result has been an increasing resort to government as a source of 
financing." 
9 See Alan B. Kruger and William G. Bowen, Income-Contingent College Loans , 7 J 
Econ Persp 193, 195-96 (1993); Marc Nerlove, Some Problems inthe Use of Income-Contingent 
Loans for the Finance of Higher Education , 83 J Polit Econ 157, 165, 180 (1975). Yale's Tuition 
Postponement Option, in effect from 1972 to 1978, was the most prominent effort. See Still 
Paying after All These Years , 62 Yale Alumni Mag (Feb 1999), online at 
http://www.yalealumnimagazine.com/issues/99_02/l_v.html (visited Oct 25, 2011) (discussing 
the drawbacks ofYale's Tuition Postponement Option plan, which required students omake 
tuition payments based on their income after graduation). 10 See Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise , 89 Yale L J 835, 859-62 
(1980). 11 See US Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2012 186, online at 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012edition.html (visited Oct 25, 2011). 
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Historically, much of that financing has been on the supply side, 
as state and local governments have built large systems of 
government-owned-and-operated institutions of higher education, 
ranging from local community colleges to major research 
universities, and have then charged local citizens low or no tuition to 
enroll. From the first Morrill Act of 1862, 12 a significant component 
of the funds for these institutions has come from the federal 
government, but the bulk of the governmental funds has been 
provided by the states.13 While the land-grant colleges of the late 
nineteenth century substantially expanded the role of public 
education, an even larger expansion came a century later, following 
the Second World War. As Table 1 shows, in 1949 roughly half of all 
postsecondary students were enrolled in private nonprofit 
institutions, and the other half in public institutions- a ratio that had 
remained essentially constant at least since 1920." Twenty-five years 
later, in 1974, that ratio had changed dramatically, with public 
institutions holding nearly four times the market share of nonprofit 
institutions'5- a ratio between the two ownership forms that has 
since remained roughly constant.'6 
This great expansion of public colleges and universities in the 
third quarter of the twentieth century was a response to rapidly 
growing demand. As Table 1 shows, total enrollment in institutions 
of higher education was more than four times larger in 1974 than it 
was in 1949, spurred by large numbers of returning soldiers, the 
postwar baby boom, greater prosperity, demand for a more highly 
skilled workforce, and substantial increases in government funding. 
Rather than seeking to induce the nonprofit sector to expand 
sufficiently to accommodate most or all of the expanded enrollment, 
state and local governments simply built and operated the necessary 
facilities themselves, expanding old campuses and establishing new 
ones." 
12 Pub L No 37-108. 12 Stat 503 (1862). codified at7 USC § 301 et sea. 
13 See Wren, 57 Bus Hist Rev at 321-23 (cited in note 7). 14 See Henry Hansmann, The Changing Roles of Public, Private , and Nonprofit 
Enterprise in Education, Health Care, and Other Human Services , in Victor R. Fuchs, ed, 
Individual nd Social Responsibility: Child Care, Education, Medical Care, and Long-Term 
Care in America 245, 267 table 9.2 (Chicago 1996). 15 National Center for Education Statistics, Total Fall Enrollment i  Degree-Granting 
Institutions, by Attendance Status, Sex of Student, and Control f Institution: Selected Years, 
1947 through 2008 (2009), online at http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d09/tables/dt09_189.asp 
(visited Oct 20, 2011). 16 Id. 
17 Alice M. Rivlin and June O'Neill, Growth and Change in Higher Education , 30 Proc 
Acad Pol Sci 66, 69 (1970). 
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This was probably the only feasible route. Nonprofit institutions 
were unlikely to meet the rapidly swelling demand regardless of the 
kind or quantity of subsidies offered them. Nonprofit institutions in 
general exhibit sluggish supply response, expanding only slowly 
when demand increases.18 One reason is that nonprofits generally 
have poor access to capital, being barred from equity financing and 
limited in their ability to borrow- particularly in the start-up phase." 
Moreover, established nonprofits commonly react to increased 
demand by increasing the quality rather than the quantity of the 
services they offer- a phenomenon that's easy to observe among 
elite colleges. One reason for this, presumably, is that personal pride 
and satisfaction from providing high-quality services are important 
incentives for nonprofit managers.20 Another likely reason- at least 
among the more selective colleges- is that the associative aspect of 
higher education pushes in the same direction.21 
A third alternative for meeting the large postwar increase in 
demand for higher education was to induce entry by proprietary 
institutions. Only tentative efforts in this direction were made in the 
first twenty-five years after the Second World War.22 More recently, 
however, subsidizing expansion of for-profit higher education has 
become a major component of federal aid programs.23 The evolution 
of demand-side subsidies, particularly from the federal government, 
is at the center of these developments. 
18 See Henry Hansmann, The Effect of Tax Exemption a d Other Factors on the Market 
Share of Nonprofit versus For-Profit Firms , 40 Natl Tax J 71, 77-78 (1987); Bruce Steinwald 
and Duncan Neuhauser, The Role of the Proprietary Hospital , 35 L & Contemp Probs 817, 
829-30 (1970). See also Henry Hansmann, Daniel Kessler, and Mark McClellan, Ownership 
Form and Trapped Capital in the Hospital Industry , in Edward L. Glaeser, ed, The Governance 
of Not-for-Profit Organizations 45,57-68 (Chicago 2003) (providing empirical evidence of the 
relative slowness of nonprofits in exiting an industry with falling demand). See also generally 
Darius Lakdawalla and Tomas Philipson, Nonprofit Production a d Competition (NBER 
Working Paper No 6377, Jan 1998), online at http://www.nber.org/papers/w6377.pdf (visited 
Oct 26, 2011) (listing other factors limiting expansion of nonprofit rms). 19 See Hansmann, 89Yale L J at 877 (cited in note 10). 
20 See id. See also Edward L. Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer, Not-for-Profit Entrepreneurs , 
81 J Pub Econ 99, 107-08 (2001) (asserting that reputational concerns help to increase quality 
of nonprofit services). 21 See Hansmann, 2 J L, Econ, & Org at 119-20 (cited in note 5). 22 See Nicholas R. Johnson, Phoenix Rising: Default Rates at Proprietary Institutions f 
Higher Education a d What Can Be Done to Reduce Them , 40 J L & Educ 225, 228-29 (2011). 23 See id at 231-38. 
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C. Demand-Side Governmental Subsidies 
The GI Bill of 194424 gave veterans extensive demand-side 
subsidies for higher education and made those subsidies tenable at 
proprietary as well as nonprofit and governmental schools.25 The 
succeeding five years saw the creation of more than five thousand 
proprietary schools, many of which were thought to be vastly 
overcharging for the education they offered.26 Congress responded 
with a provision in the Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act of 19522' 
requiring that proprietary schools receiving that federally subsidized 
tuition have a student body in which at least 15 percent of the 
students were paying tuition without the aid of the GI Bill, hence 
exposing the schools to a limited market test.28 Congress went even 
further when it passed the Higher Education Act of 1965, 
29 Title IV 
of which became and has remained the principal source of federal 
student aid for higher education.3" That Act expressly confined 
financial assistance to students who attended public or nonprofit 
institutions,31 cutting out proprietary institutions completely. 
Perhaps owing to changes in national politics, demand-side 
subsidies were again made widely available to proprietary schools 
with the enactment of the 1972 amendments32 to the Higher 
Education Act of 1965, which eliminated the restriction of Title IV 
aid to students at governmental and nonprofit schools.31 Subsequent 
amendments to the Act in 197934 and 198615 further broadened access 
24 Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944 (GI Bill), Pub L No 78-346, 58 Stat 284. 25 GI Bill § 400, 58 Stat at 290. 
26 Daniel Golden, Veterans Failing Shows Hazards of For-Profit Schools in GI Bill ,
Bloomberg (Sept 23, 2010), online at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-23/veterans- 
failing-to-learn-show-hazards-of-for-profit-schools-under-gi-bill.html (visite  Oct 26, 2011)  27 Pub L No 82-550, 66 Stat 663, codified at 38 USC § 991 et seq, repealed by the 
Veterans' Readjustment Benefits Act of 1966, Pub L No 89-358, 0 Stat 12. 
28 Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act of 1952 § 226, 66 Stat at 667. See also 
generally Golden, Veterans Failing Shows Hazards of For-Profit Schools in GI Bill (cited in 
note 26); Robert Shireman, For Guidance on For-Profit Colleges, Look to the GI Bill (Campus 
Progress May 11, 2011), online at http://www.campusprogress.org/articles/for_guidance_on_for- 
profit_colleges_look_to_the_gi_bill/ (visited Oct 26, 2011). 29 Pub L No 89-329, 79 Stat 1219, codified asamended in various sections of Title 20. 
30 William S.Howard, The Student Loan Crisis and the Race to Princeton Law School , 7 J 
L, Econ, & Policy 485, 495 (2011). 31 Higher Education Act of 1965 § 435(a)(4), 79 Stat at 1247-48, 20 USC § 1001(a)(4). 32 Education Amendments of 1972, Pub L No 92-318, 6 Stat 235, codified asamended in 
various sections of Title 20. 
33 Education Amendments of 1972 §131, 20 USC § 1002(a)(1)(A). 34 Higher Education Technical Amendments of 1979, Pub L No 96-49, 93 Stat 351, 
amending various sections of Title 20. 35 Higher Education Amendments of 1986, Pub L No 99-498, 100 Stat 1268, codified at
20 USC § 1001 et seq. 
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to for-profit schools while also increasing the amount of loan funds 
available. 
The result was a repetition of the experience with the first GI 
Bill. The grants and the subsidized and guaranteed loan funds 
provided under this legislation fueled a rapid rise in the market share 
of proprietary schools that began in the 1970s.36 As Table 1 shows, 
that market share doubled between 1974 and 1979, and by 2009 was 
thirty times larger than it had been in 1974. Indeed, by 2009, private 
institutions were serving one-third of all students enrolled in private 
(nongovernmental) institutions of higher education. Many of these 
institutions are large. As of 2010, fourteen of the companies 
providing postsecondary education were publicly traded, and the 
largest of them, the University of Phoenix, enrolled 470,000 
students.57 
These proprietary institutions are extraordinarily dependent 
upon federal subsidies. As of 2010, for example, the University of 
Phoenix obtained 88 percent of its revenue from Title IV funds,3" and 
this figure seems typical for the proprietary higher education sector 
in general.3' In turn, proprietary institutions account for a 
disproportionate share of Title IV funds: 19 percent as of 2009, as 
compared with 48 percent for public schools and 33 percent for 
private nonprofits.4" 
The rapid growth in proprietary schools over recent decades has 
seemingly been accompanied by an equally rapid growth in 
exploitation of both consumers and the federal government, echoing 
the experience under the first GI Bill. The typical form of abuse is to 
induce individuals to enroll, against their interest, in courses of 
instruction that are unsuited for them, that they are unlikely to 
36 See William Beaver, For-Profit Higher Education: A Social and Historical Analysis , 
25 Sociological Viewpoints 53, 56-57 (Fall 2009). 
37 Compare Apollo Group, Inc, 2010 Annual Report 14 (2010), online at 
http://www.apollogrp.edu/Annual-Reports/Apollo2010AR.pdf (visited Oct 26, 2011), with 
University of California, Statistical Summary of Students and Staff 1-27 (2009), online at 
http://www.ucop.edu/ucophome/uwnews/stat/statsum/fall2009/statsumm2009.pdf (visited Oct 
26, 2011). 38 Apollo Group, Inc, Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended August 31, 2010 35, online at 
http://www.sec.gOv/Archives/edgar/data/929887/000095012310094652/pl8193el0vk.htm#124 
(visited Oct 26, 2011). 39 For example, the proportion was 82 percent in 2010 for Kaplan Higher Education, a 
subsidiary of the Washington Post Company with ninety-seven thousand students enrolled. See 
Washington Post Company, Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended January 2, 2011 1-2, online at 
http://sec.gOv/Archives/edgar/data/104889/000119312511053497/dl0k.htm (visited Oct 26, 2011). 40 See Government Accountability Office, Proprietary Schools: Stronger Department of 
Education Oversight Needed to Help Ensure Only Eligible Students Receive Federal Student 
Aid 5 (Aug 2009), online at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09600.pdf (visited Oct 26, 2011). 
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complete, that teach skills for which there is no market, or that are 
simply overpriced. Schools induce these individuals to pay for this 
unproductive education not just with federal grants but also with 
loans that are provided or guaranteed by the federal government, 
but for which the students will remain personally liable. (Indeed, 
current law generally prevents these loans from being discharged 
even in bankruptcy.41) Congress and the Department of Education 
have sought to control this abusive behavior in recent years through 
a sequence of regulatory measures, with only modest results to date.42 
We will return below to the prospects for ultimate success in this 
regard. 
D. A Comparison to Health Care 
The evolution of the American health care industry, and 
particularly the hospital sector, provides an instructive comparison to 
the development of higher education. The growing demand for 
hospital care after the Second World War was first met by supply- 
side subsidies, such as the federal Hill-Burton grants to public and 
nonprofit hospitals.43 The implementation of Medicare and Medicaid 
in the mid-1960s altered that approach, providing extensive demand- 
side subsidies for hospital services that could be used at proprietary 
hospitals as well as at nonprofit and public hospitals. The result was 
the entry and rapid growth of proprietary hospitals, including 
publicly traded hospital chains. The market share of proprietary 
hospitals, which had remained constant at 6 percent from 1960 to 
1971, doubled over the next 20 years to 12 percent in 1992.44 This 
growth came entirely at the expense of the share held by 
government-owned hospitals, which declined from 31 percent in 1971 
to 24 percent in 1992.45 The proprietary hospitals that proliferated 
after 1965 did not, in general, present serious problems concerning 
quality of care or exploitation of patients. Although there were some 
scandals, they typically involved financial fraud directed at the 
governmental Medicare and Medicaid programs rather than 
41 See 11 USC § 523(a)(8). 42 Government Accountability Office, Proprietary Schools at 9, 22-28 (cited in note 40). 43 See Department of Health and Human Services, Hill-Burton Free and Reduced-Cost 
Health Care , online at http://www.hrsa.gov/gethealthcare/affordable/hillburton/hillburton.pdf 
(visited Oct 26, 2011). 44 Hansmann, Changing Roles at 254 (cited in note 14). 45 Id at 256. 
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provision of substandard care to patients, or systematic provision of 
expensive care for which there was no medical need.46 
What accounts for the relative success in expanding the hospital 
sector by encouraging the expansion of proprietary institutions 
through demand-side subsidies, while the same approach was 
accompanied by serious problems in higher education and, instead, 
public institutions have been relied upon for increasing the supply of 
higher education? 
Medical doctors as of 1965 practiced almost universally as sole 
practitioners or in partnerships, and hence were essentially in 
business for themselves.47 They were generally not employees of the 
hospitals in which they had admitting privileges but rather billed their 
patients separately while at the same time exercising considerable 
control over the hospitals' management.48 As a consequence, 
proprietary institutions were perfectly familiar to them, while at the 
same time the profession was overtly hostile to the socialization of 
medicine.4' College and university professors of that era, in contrast, 
were nearly all employees of nonprofit or governmental institutions, 
with little experience- and much suspicion- of proprietary 
enterprise. 
A related reason for the success of proprietary hospitals may be 
that, since medical doctors were not employees of the hospitals 
where they treated patients, they had an interest in maintaining the 
quality of those hospitals and were in a position to police effectively 
the services that the hospitals offered. The nonprofit or 
governmental form was not needed to blunt the institutions' 
incentives to behave opportunistically for their patients. 
Yet another reason may be that hospital care is a more 
homogeneous service than is higher education, and hence is easier to 
monitor and regulate either publicly or privately. An appendectomy 
is performed more or less in the same way in all US hospitals, 
without major variation among institutions that treat the prosperous 
and the poor, the educated and the ignorant, the ambitious and the 
46 While there is substantial evidence of excessive care in the sector in general, it seems 
to have been induced in large part by the threat of malpractice litigation a d to have affected 
nonprofit as well as for-profit hospitals. See Office of Technology Assessment, USCongress, 
Defensive Medicine and Medicine Malpractice , OTA-H-602, 39-74 (GPO 1994). See also Daniel 
Kessler and Mark McClellan, DoDoctors Practice Defensive Medicine ?, Ill Q J Econ 353, 356-58, 
372-88 (1996) (explaining how tort reforms affect the practice of defensive medicine). 
47 Hansmann, Changing Roles at 257 (cited in note 14). 
48 See Mark Pauly and Michael Redisch, The Not- for- Profit Hospital as a Physicians' 
Cooperative, 63 Am Econ Rev 87, 87-88 (1973). 49 See Kim Geiger and Tom Hamburger, AMA Does 180 on Health Care , Chi Trib 42 
(Sept 13, 2009). 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.182 on Fri, 14 Mar 2014 20:07:44 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
2012] Evolving Economic Structure of Higher Education 169 
lazy. An introductory course in English literature, on the other hand, 
may take a very different shape for different types of students. 
III. Quality Assurance 
The account of the evolution of higher education offered above 
raises two questions. First, is for-profit higher education just a 
hothouse flower, opportunistically taking advantage of poorly 
regulated public subsidies- and something that will largely disappear 
if and when meaningful consumer-protection regulation can be 
implemented? Second, even if there is a permanent place for a 
substantial for-profit sector in higher education, will that place 
always be at the bottom of the educational hierarchy, largely 
providing basic preparation for trades of limited sophistication? To 
answer either question, it's necessary to address the problem of 
quality assurance. 
American higher education flourished for two hundred years 
without a meaningful system of governmental quality regulation. To 
be sure, beginning at the end of the nineteenth century, a private- 
sector form of quality assurance grew up in the form of the six 
regional accrediting associations for colleges and universities.5" But 
these associations, which are controlled by the institutions that they 
accredit,51 have never succeeded in establishing- or even tried to 
establish- clear and objective ratings or even minimum standards 
for accreditation. Rather, they have traditionally seen their role as 
simply working with each individual institution to help it define and 
meet its own internal goals. It may be, however, that there is 
relatively little more that can be done. Widely applicable and 
objective standards for measuring the quality of education that any 
institution provides are difficult to devise without making them 
arbitrary and stifling. 
Despite the lack of external policing, the overall quality of 
American higher education has been high by world standards, and 
until recently there have been remarkably few scandals involving the 
quality of education offered even by individual institutions. There 
50 See Mary Glenn Wiley and Mayer N. Zald, The Growth and Transformation of 
Educational Accrediting A encies: An Exploratory Study in Social Control f Institutions , 41 
Sociology Educ 36, 36-37 (1968); California Postsecondary Education Commission, Accrediting 
Agencies , online at http://www.cpec.ca.gov/CollegeGuide/ AccreditingAgencies.asp?Type=Regional 
(visited Oct 26, 2011). 51 See Howard, 7 J L, Econ, & Policy at 505 (cited in note 30); William E. Troutt, 
Regional Accreditation Evaluative Criteria and Quality Assurance , 50 J Higher Ed 199, 199-203, 
206-09 (1979). 
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seem to be two possible explanations for this: (1) institutional form 
and (2) competition. 
A. Institutional Form 
One reason why quality assurance has not been a major problem 
may be that, until recently, nearly all nongovernmental institutions 
of higher education were nonprofit. The nonprofit form dulls the 
incentives of managers to exploit their consumers, giving them 
instead an incentive to provide a level of quality higher than that 
which would maximize net revenue.52 If the quality of service offered 
by proprietary schools is too difficult for students or their parents to 
assess ex ante with much accuracy, then the sector may be poorly 
suited to profit-seeking firms, at least until some effective form of 
quality regulation can be established. If, moreover, effective forms of 
regulation can be established only for simple trade schools, and not 
for the elaborate forms of education now offered by the more 
selective institutions, then the latter institutions evidently must 
continue to be organized as either nonprofit or governmental entities. 
B. Competition 
With the exception of the military academies, the US 
government has never itself owned and operated institutions of 
higher education.53 Rather, the governmental presence in 
administering education, while large, has been at the state and local 
level. While the politics behind this development are the same that 
produced a highly fragmented and apparently inefficient banking 
system for the better part of two centuries,54 the consequences for 
higher education have evidently been salutary. Public as well as 
private colleges and universities have had to compete in a national 
market for both students and faculty. And, although those colleges 
and universities have, until recently, been almost exclusively either 
governmental or nonprofit, they have evidently responded well to 
the pressures of that competition. It is difficult to find any other 
reason to explain why American higher education is so strong by 
world standards while American primary and secondary education- 
commonly a local public monopoly- is so weak. 
52 See Glaeser and Shleifer, 81J Pub Econ at 100-02 (cited in note 20). 
53 See Department of State, ADiverse Educational System , online at http://usinfo.org/enus 
/education/overview/ch6.html (visited Oct 21, 2011). 
54 See Geoffrey P. Miller, Interstate Banking in the Court, 1985 Sup Ct Rev 179, 181-83, 
208-25. See generally Eugene Nelson White, The Political Economy of Banking Regulation 
1864-1933 , 42 J Econ Hist 33 (1982). 
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The constitutional powers of the individual states play an 
important role here. The courts have never found higher tuition for 
out-of-state students at state universities to be an impermissible 
burden on interstate commerce.55 Consequently, state universities 
routinely discriminate in this fashion, and therefore have a strong 
incentive to attract students from other states. The European 
Union- regrettably, and perhaps tragically- seems not to have 
taken a lesson from this experience. The creation of a European 
common market for higher education held out the promise that 
interstate competition would overcome the deleterious effects of the 
centralized state control of higher education that has become 
characteristic of European nations, and that arguably accounts for 
the decline of European universities in the twentieth century after 
nearly a millennium of world dominance. But the promise of such 
competition has seemingly been scotched by EU regulations 
prohibiting public universities from admitting students from other 
EU member states on different terms than those offered in-state 
students.56 The consequence is that the challenge to the United States 
for world superiority in higher education may well come from Asia 
rather than from Europe. 
It remains to ask whether national (or international) 
competition will be sufficient to discipline for-profit institutions of 
higher education if and as they expand their share of the market. 
This is a question that perhaps needs to be addressed separately for 
the top end of the market (high-quality undergraduate and graduate 
education in the arts and sciences) and for the bottom end of the 
market (instruction in basic skills for specific trades). 
It seems plausible that competition would be more than 
adequate to discipline for-profit institutions at the top end of the 
market, if there were any. Institutions at that level quickly develop 
national reputations, and there are many publications available to 
help develop and spread these reputations among potential 
consumers. If for-profit institutions were to seek to enter the top end 
of the education market, therefore, there is every reason to believe 
55 The Supreme Court has never explicitly ruled that charging higher tuition to out-of- 
state students atpublic educational institutions is consistent with the dormant Commerce 
Clause. Nonetheless, "[t]here are . . . strong indications that he Court would find no commerce 
clause problem if the question were squarely presented." Dan T. Coenen, State User Fees and 
the Dormant Commerce Clause , 50 Vand L Rev 795, 807 n 60, 840-41 (1997). 56 See Gravier v City of Liege, Case 293/83, 1985 ECR 593, % 26 (Court of First Instance); 
Commission f the European Communities v Austria , Case C-147/03, 2005 ECR 1-5969, %75 
(Second Chamber). But see The Queen v London Borough ofEaling, Case C-209/03, 2005 ECR 1-2119, 
56-57 (Grand Chamber). 
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that market forces would quickly sort the wheat from the chaff. The 
question for elite higher education, instead, is whether proprietary 
institutions are for some reason incapable of creating the right 
incentives for producing quality equal to the level reached by 
prominent public and nonprofit colleges and universities. This is a 
question we will return to below.5' 
It is less obvious that competition alone, absent regulation, can 
provide adequate discipline for proprietary schools at the lower end 
of the market for higher education, where they are now 
concentrated. Experience to date suggests that completion alone will 
not suffice.58 But there is reason to be hopeful. For one thing, the 
problem has been largely driven by excessively easy credit subsidized 
by the federal government- offering a strong parallel, as many have 
noted, to the credit-driven housing bubble of the recent past and the 
opportunistic transactions it fostered.5" One solution is to make 
proprietary institutions ineligible for participation in federal 
educational aid programs. But that would throw out the baby with 
the bathwater. 
Direct regulation of the minimum acceptable quality of 
education that can be offered by an institution participating in 
federal student aid programs also does not seem a promising 
approach. To be sure, it is an approach that looks more feasible for 
the types of trade-focused education offered by most proprietary 
schools than for education at the top of the market. But directly 
measuring the quality of instruction is nonetheless an elusive task. 
The private-sector accrediting agencies, as we have noted, have not 
been very successful at it.6" And the special agencies that have grown 
up to accredit for-profit schools are understandably no better.61 
But direct regulation of quality may not be essential. The core 
problem presented by opportunistic proprietary schools seems not so 
much that they offer an education that is in itself of insufficiently 
high quality to be useful to anyone, but rather that it is sold to the 
wrong people, and at an excessively high price. In essence, the 
57 See Part IV. 
58 See, for example, Golden, Veterans Failing Shows Hazards of For-Profit Schools in Gl 
Bill (cited in note 26); Beaver, 25 Sociological Viewpoints at 55-56 (cited in note 36). 59 See, for example, Higher Education: The Latest Bubble ?, Economist Schumpeter Blog 
(Economist Apr 13, 2011), online at http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2011/04 
/higher_education (visited Oct 21, 2011). 
60 See notes 50-51 and accompanying text. 61 See, for example, Kevin Kinser, ASHE Higher Education Report, From Main Street to 
Wall Street: The Transformation of For-Profit Higher Education 98-99, 106-08 (Jossey-Bass 
2006). 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.182 on Fri, 14 Mar 2014 20:07:44 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
2012] Evolving Economic Structure of Higher Education 173 
abusive schools are not offering their students too little education 
but rather too much education, or the wrong kind of education. And 
these are easier problems to solve through regulation. Current and 
proposed regulatory reforms in fact take this approach, restricting 
access to federal student aid for schools that attract little tuition 
beyond federal aid funds, or that have disproportionately large 
numbers of students who fail to complete their degrees, or fail to find 
employment following graduation, or fail to repay their loans.62 
There is a parallel here in the experience with proprietary 
hospital care. Though there have been a number of financial scandals 
involving for-profit hospitals, particularly with respect to abuse of 
public subsidies under Medicare and Medicaid,63 scandals involving 
the quality of hospital care seem to be rare. The large proprietary 
hospital chains perhaps understand that a scandal involving poor- 
quality care in any part of their system could severely damage the 
reputation of the enterprise as a whole, cutting revenues badly, 
whereas defrauding a public insurance program does not pose a 
threat to anybody's life, including the lives of the individuals covered 
by the program. The regulatory response has been more careful 
audits of proprietary hospitals. More generally, empirical studies 
have had to look hard to find systematic differences in the quality of 
care offered by nonprofit and for-profit hospitals.64 And the quality 
of instruction offered by an institution of higher education, it would 
seem, is no harder for consumers to evaluate than is the quality of 
the medical care offered by a hospital. 
Ongoing changes in the lower end of the education market may 
also permit competition to discipline proprietary institutions more 
effectively in the future, with decreasing reliance on public 
regulation. The tendency toward consolidation of proprietary 
schools into a smaller number of large firms makes reputation more 
62 See Department of Education, Program Integrity: Gainful Employment-Debt 
Measures, 76 Fed Reg 34386, 34413-18 (2011) (amending 34 CFR § 668); Department of 
Education, Obama Administration An ounces New Steps to Protect Students from Ineffective 
Career College Programs (June 2, 2011), online at http://www.ed.gov/news/press- 
releases/gainful-employment-regulations (visited Oct 27, 2011); Johnson, 40J L & Educ at 
238-51 (cited in note 22). 
63 See Dan Ackman, Disaster of the Day: HCA, Forbes (Dec 15, 2000), online at 
http://www.forbes.com/2000/12/15/1215disaster.html (visited Oct 21, 2011). 64 See, for example, Catherine Plate, The Differentiation between For-Profit and 
Nonprofit Hospitals: Another Look ,12 Rsrch Healthcare Fin Mgmt 7 (2008). But see Pauline 
Vaillancourt Rosenau and Stephen H. Linder, Two Decades of Research Comparing For-Profit 
and Nonprofit Health Provider Performance in the United States, 84 Soc Sci Q 219, 220-29 
(2003); Pervaiz Alam, Essam Elshafie, and David Jarjoura, The Effect of Ownership Structure 
on Performance of Hospitals, 12 Acad of Acct 37, 47 (2008). 
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effective as a constraint on firm behavior. New information 
technologies, such as online learning, may further foster 
consolidation, both nationally and internationally. 
However difficult it may be to assure reasonable quality and 
pricing in proprietary postsecondary education, there may be little 
choice but to undertake the task. The evidence suggests that public 
schools, such as community colleges, are insufficiently flexible to 
provide the variety and quantity of vocational and trade school 
programs, or the adjustment of those programs to the practical needs 
of students, that proprietary institutions can offer.65 And nonprofit 
institutions, as we have noted,66 tend to have a high-quality bias that 
causes them to refrain from serving the low end of the market in 
service industries. Thus, whether the service is nursing care, day care, 
or primary and secondary education, nonprofit institutions are 
common in the top end of the market but generally do not provide 
the low quality but essential services that are all that the poor and 
disadvantaged can pay for.67 
In sum, there seems good reason to believe that proprietary 
institutions will continue to expand their role in the lower end of the 
market for postsecondary education, at least if appropriate 
regulation is adopted to enhance the effectiveness of competition 
(although the initial effect of such regulation may be to shrink the 
proprietary sector- perhaps radically- by squeezing out the more 
opportunistic of the current schools). 
But can proprietary institutions also ultimately succeed at the 
higher end of the education market? We turn to that issue next. 
IV. Characteristics of Nonprofit and Public Institutions 
We noted above that competition may well be an effective 
source of discipline for high-end proprietary schools.68 But are there 
important characteristics of the best nonprofit and governmental 
colleges and universities that cannot be replicated by proprietary 
firms? In approaching the latter question, we'll focus on three central 
65 See Regina Deil-Amen, James E. Rosenbaum, and Ann E. Person, Illusions of 
Opportunity? From College Access to Job Access at Two-Year Colleges , in Gary Orfield, 
Patricia Marin, and Catherine L. Horn, eds, Higher Education and the Color Line: College 
Access , Racial Equity, and Social Change 107, 116-25 (Harvard 2005). 
66 See note 20 and accompanying text. 67 See, for example, Niccie L. McKay, The Effect of Chain Ownership on Nursing Home 
Costs, 26 Health Servs Rsrch 109, 109-10 (1991) (noting that nonprofit nursing homes erve 
disproportionately the high-quality high-cost end of the market). 68 See Part III.B. 
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and related issues: research, academic tenure, and faculty self- 
governance. 
A. Research 
Faculties at major nonprofit and public universities are generally 
expected to engage in academic research as well as teaching. Might it 
be difficult for proprietary institutions to produce research of similar 
quantity and quality, given that research, unlike education, is 
commonly a public good? 
Even if the answer to this question is no, this need not be a bar 
to an important role for proprietary institutions in higher-quality 
higher education. Many of the nation's best undergraduate 
colleges- such as Amherst, Smith, and Williams- provide no 
substantial amount of graduate education and have faculties that are 
principally focused on undergraduate teaching rather than research. 
It is with institutions such as these that proprietary schools might 
first be expected to compete. 
Moreover, proprietary institutions may well be able to 
undertake research as well as teaching. A large fraction of research 
in the sciences is funded by governmental or private grants69 that 
presumably could be administered by proprietary as well as 
nonproprietary institutions. Many specialized proprietary research 
firms already get the bulk of their income from governmental 
research grants and contracts.7" And some of the nation's largest 
university-affiliated hospitals, which undertake substantial research 
and teaching, are administered by for-profit hospital chains under 
contracts that at most leave the hospitals nonprofit in name (and tax 
status) only." 
B. Tenure 
Lifetime tenure for faculty is one of the most striking features 
that distinguishes the internal organization of public and nonprofit 
institutions of higher education from typical investor-owned firms, 
whether in higher education or in industry in general. 
Although the tenure system has roots at least as far back as 
Harvard's adoption in the 1820s of an "up or out" system for electing 
69 See Becky Oskin, The Road Less Traveled , New Scientist 54, 54 (August 27, 2011). 70 See Congressional Budget Office, Federal Support for Research and Development 
(June 2007), online at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/82xx/doc8221/06-18-Research.pdf (visited Oct 
31,2011). 
71 See John A. Kastor, Selling Teaching Hospitals and Practice Plans: George Washington 
and Georgetown U iversities 1, 183-91 (Johns Hopkins 2008). 
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tutors to endowed professorships, it is largely a twentieth century 
phenomenon. The principal moving force behind its adoption was 
the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), formed 
as a guild of sorts in 1913, 
72 and the principal characteristics of the 
tenure system were established in agreements negotiated between 
the AAUP and the America Association of Colleges (a grouping of 
university presidents).73 The second and stronger of these 
agreements, adopted in 1940, essentially followed the Harvard "up 
or out" model. The model embodied in this agreement spread 
rapidly; by 1970 it had been adopted by virtually every substantial 
institution of higher education in the country.74 
In recent decades, however, the tide has turned. From 1975 to 
2009, the proportion of faculty on the tenure track in US colleges fell 
by nearly half, from 57 to 30 percent.75 The common alternative to a 
tenure track appointment is a contract for a term of one year or 
longer, either full-time or, increasingly, part-time.76 Colleges and 
universities are making the shift from tenured to nontenured faculty 
in several ways. Some are keeping the tenure system for selected 
faculty but are hiring an increasing percentage of faculty off the 
tenure track; some are abolishing tenure for all future hires, while 
grandfathering faculty who already have tenure; and some new 
institutions are being founded without tenure from the beginning.77 
Proprietary schools generally do not grant tenure, while institutions 
72 See Walter P. Metzger, Academic Tenure in America: AHistorical Essay , in William 
R. Keast and John W. Macy Jr, eds, Faculty Tenure: AReport and Recommendations by the 
Commission  Academic Tenure in Higher Education 93, 135-36 (Jossey-Bass 1973). 
73 See id at 148-56. 
74 See id at 152-55. 
75 Laura G. Knapp, Janice E. Kelley-Reid, and Scott A. Ginder, Employees in 
Postsecondary Institutions, Fall2009, and Salaries of Full-Time Instructional Staff, 2009-10 3
(National Center for Education Statistics 2010), online at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2011/2011150.pdf 
(visited Oct 31, 2011) ("Of the approximately 1.4 million full-time professionals reported to be 
employed at degree-granting institutions and administrative offices (excluding medical 
schools) ... 21 percent [have] tenure, 9 percent [are] on tenure track."); Robin Wilson, Tenure, 
RIP: What he Vanishing Status Means for the Future of Education , Chron Higher Ed (July 4, 
2010), online at http://chronicle.com/article/Tenure-RIP/66114/ (visited Oct 31, 2011). 76 See Jack Stripling, Most Presidents Prefer No Tenure for Majority of Faculty , Chron 
Higher Ed A12 (May 15, 2011); Robin Wilson, Contracts Replace the Tenure Track for a 
Growing Number of Professors, Chron Higher Ed A12 (June 12, 1998). 77 See Wilson, Contracts Replace the Tenure Track, Chron Higher Ed at A12 (cited in 
note 76); Observations  Creating a New Paradigm for Undergraduate Education i Engineering, 
Hearings before the Secretary of Education's Commission on the Future of Higher Education *5-7 
(Mar 20, 2006) (testimony of Richard K. Miller, founding president, Franklin W. Olin College of 
Engineering), online at http://www2.ed.gov/about/bdscomm/list/hiedfuture/2nd-hearing/miller2.pdf 
(visited Oct 31, 2011). 
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at the top of the market- the elite schools and colleges- have been 
the slowest to move away from tenure.™ 
What accounts for this dramatic rise and ebb in the tenure 
system during the latter half of the twentieth century, and what is 
likely to happen to tenure in the future? Changes in demand and 
supply of professorial talent may explain much of the recent past. 
The enormous postwar demand for faculty gave the profession 
substantial bargaining power, and it must have been tempting for 
university administrators to bid for faculty by offering employment 
benefits, such as tenure, many of whose costs would be incurred by 
the university only far in the future, while the benefits would be 
immediate. Since the early 1970s, however, the supply of new PhDs 
has substantially exceeded the demand for academic faculty," and 
bargaining power has shifted. Yet these market shifts do not tell us 
clearly whether social welfare might be best served by retaining 
tenure in at least the upper ranges of the higher education market. 
To approach that question, it makes sense to start with costs and 
benefits. 
The conventional argument for tenure in higher education is 
that it provides the protection needed for faculty members to 
address controversial topics in both teaching and research."" As 
others have pointed out, however, this is not a particularly 
persuasive justification. Lifetime tenure is neither necessary nor 
sufficient to protect intellectual freedom in colleges and universities, 
including in particular the freedom to express socially or politically 
unpopular views.81 The strongest justification that has been offered 
for tenure, rather, is that it facilitates hiring competent faculty.82 
Knowledge in academic disciplines has become so specialized and 
esoteric, it is argued, that the choice of whom to hire in a given field 
must be delegated to the school's current faculty who specialize in 
78 See Stripling, Most Presidents , Chron Higher Ed at A12 (cited in note 76); Wilson, 
Tenure, RIP, Chron Higher Ed at A12 (cited in note 75). 79 See Supply-Side Academics , 10 Nature Neuroscience 1337, 1337 (2007). 
80 See Richard T. De George, Academic Freedom and Tenure: Ethical Issues 13-14 
(Rowman & Littlefield 1997). 
81 See Stephen J. Ceci, Wendy M. Williams, and Katrin Mueller- Johnson, Is Tenure 
Justified? An Experimental Study of Faculty Beliefs about Tenure, Promotion, a d Academic 
Freedom , 29 Behav & Brain Sci 553, 567-68 (2006); Richard Posner, Tenured Employment , 
Becker-Posner Blog (Jan 15, 2006), online at http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2006/01 
/tenured-employment-posner.html (visited Oct 31, 2011) ("If a university wishes to offer its 
faculty protection against political retaliation for unpopular views, itcan do that by writing into 
the employment contract that politics is an impermissible ground for termination."). 82 See H. Lorne Carmichael, Incentives in Academics: Why Is There Tenure?, 96 J Pol 
Econ 453, 454-63, 471 (1988). 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.182 on Fri, 14 Mar 2014 20:07:44 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
178 The University of Chicago Law Review [79:159 
that field. If those faculty lack tenure, however, they may not choose 
the most qualified candidates for fear of hiring their own 
replacements."3 Against this benefit must be set off the familiar 
disadvantages of extreme job security, including institutional rigidity, 
poor incentives for productivity, discouragement of institutional risk 
taking, and the paradoxical pressure on young untenured faculty not 
to offend their elder colleagues. 
We can get some helpful perspective on the evolving trade-offs 
among these considerations by looking at large corporate law firms 
in the United States, which for the first three quarters of the 
twentieth century almost uniformly adhered to a rigid up-or-out 
system of employment, combined with an expectation that 
promotion to partner meant lifetime employment with the firm- 
precisely like academic tenure.84 Since the legal market was 
reasonably competitive and the lawyers involved owned their own 
firms, there is every reason to believe that the long survival of this 
pattern of employment was a strong indication of its efficiency. And 
the principal purpose it served, arguably, was the same as in higher 
education: it provided the senior members of the firm with an 
incentive to hire the best young talent they could find, without 
worrying that they were thereby putting their own employment at 
risk. 
But the tenure system in law firms began breaking down in the 
last quarter of the twentieth century. The principal reason seems to 
be that the market for corporate legal services shifted from being a 
market for law firms to a market for individual lawyers. As legal 
services became an increasing expense to corporations, those 
corporations created larger and more sophisticated in-house legal 
staffs.85 At first those in-house lawyers used their expertise to hire 
different law firms for different types of legal problems rather than 
getting all their services from a single firm, as had previously been 
common."6 Then they moved on to shopping for the services of 
individual lawyers who appeared specially qualified."7 Those lawyers 
83 See id at 454-63, 471. For other arguments, see Michael S. McPherson a d Gordon C. 
Winston, The Economics of Academic Tenure: A Relational Perspective , in Matthew W. Finkin, 
ed, The Case for Tenure 99, 106-21 (Cornell 1996). 
84 See Mark Galanter and Thomas Palay, Tournament of Lawyers: The Transformation 
of the Big Law Firm 26-32 (Chicago 1991). 
85 See Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Re-situating the Inside Counsel as 
Gatekeeper , 74 Fordham L Rev 983, 999 (2005). 
86 See Abram Chayes and Antonia H. Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law 
Firm , 37 Stan L Rev 277, 289-99 (1985). 87 See Ted Schneyer, Reputational Bonding , Ethics Rules, and Law Firm Structure: The 
Economist as Storyteller , 84 Va L Rev 1777, 1786-87 (1998). 
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then came to have personal reputations apart from that of the firm 
with which they were affiliated. The result was that highly productive 
lawyers could and did insist on higher remuneration than their 
colleagues received, breaking up the lockstep pay schemes of the 
past and producing substantial lateral mobility across firms, as well 
as more frequent divisions and mergers of firms."* Retaining low- 
productivity partners became expensive, cutting into the revenues 
available to hire or retain more productive colleagues, and 
generating frictions among partners in allocating earnings. 
Partnership has, as a consequence, become something much less than 
a guarantee of lifetime employment, as partners still in midcareer are 
expelled from their firms.8' At the same time, law firms are 
increasingly hiring new lawyers on a non-partner-track basis, with no 
guarantee of ongoing employment. 
Arguably much the same thing is now happening in American 
colleges and universities. The quality of individual faculty members 
is becoming increasingly apparent to persons outside the individual's 
own faculty. An individual's scholarship can be evaluated not just by 
reading the publications and working papers that are now so easily 
available electronically, but also by the increasing capacity for 
objective comparative criteria such as citation counts. And the near 
ubiquity of student teaching evaluations now makes the quality of 
teaching much easier to assess from outside the teacher's own 
institution as well. 
One consequence of these increasingly public reputations for 
individual teachers and scholars not just at the top, but throughout 
the academic hierarchy, is that it is less obvious that an institution 
must rely heavily on its own faculty to hire their new colleagues. This 
means that it is less important to grant them tenure. Moreover, the 
thicker market for academic reputation seems to be leading to much 
greater dispersion in faculty salaries, with superstars bringing in far 
more than their less conspicuous colleagues.9" This means that, if a 
faculty decides to hire someone of great prominence or even great 
promise, they may be deciding to reduce the amount of funds 
available for their own salaries. Perhaps more seriously, it increases 
88 See Robert William Hillman, Hillman on Lawyer Mobility: The Law and Ethics of 
Partner Withdrawals andLaw Firm Breakups 6-9 (Aspen 2d ed 1998). 89 See Elizabeth Goldberg, The Departed , Am Law 144, 145 (May 2007) (discussing the 
restructuring of a variety of law firms, and noting that many top law firms are "unabashedly 
pursuing growth strategies that entail orchestrated exits of partners who are deemed to be 
underperformers"). 90 Linda A. Bell, More Good News, So Why the Blues? The Annual Report on the 
Economic Status of the Profession , 1999-2000 , 86 Academe 11, 15-17 (March- April 2000). 
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heterogeneity among members of a faculty with respect to their 
terms of employment. And, as I have argued at length elsewhere, 
strong homogeneity in this respect seems essential to effective self- 
governance." The more informationally efficient that the national- 
or, increasingly, international- market for individual faculty 
becomes, therefore, the less discretion we can expect to be delegated 
to university faculties to choose their own colleagues, and 
consequently the less need there will be for academic tenure. 
C. Governance 
For similar reasons, we can reasonably expect that faculty self- 
governance in all respects- not just with respect to hiring but also 
with respect to setting the curriculum and allocating teaching 
responsibilities and research opportunities among the faculty- will 
decline. When a faculty- or any group- must decide collectively to 
allocate benefits and burdens among themselves, it is difficult to 
settle on any rule other than equality. Hence, all members of a given 
university department are generally expected to do roughly the same 
amount of teaching and committee work regardless of their relative 
skills as scholars and as teachers. In general, then, the future is likely 
to bring greater centralization of authority within American 
universities, which means an administrative model much closer to 
that found in conventional proprietary firms. 
V. A Totally Proprietary Sector? 
Should we therefore expect that American higher education will 
eventually be populated entirely with for-profit firms? That seems 
unlikely. A more plausible scenario is that proprietary institutions 
will continue to increase their market share, but that public and 
private nonprofit institutions will continue to have a substantial 
presence. Proprietary firms may displace or acquire many of the less 
well-established nonprofit colleges, but the elite institutions will 
continue to thrive. Indeed, there is evidence that nonprofit firms, 
once established, can compete with proprietary firms in a variety of 
industrial settings. Nonprofit institutions, moreover, are slow to exit 
markets whether they are thriving or not.92 (Perhaps the huge 
endowments that some universities have accumulated, seemingly 
91 This is a central theme of Hansmann, The Ownership of Enterprise (cited in note 4). 
92 See Deloitte, Trends in Hospital Ownership Type and Capacity: A Decomposition 
Analysis 14 (2009), online at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets 
/Documents/us_ps_FinancingHumanServicesReport_080709.pdf (visited Oct 21, 2011). 
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without a persuasive rationale,93 will ultimately be spent to keep 
these institutions in business, for better or for worse, much beyond 
the time when they would otherwise become unsustainable.) State 
colleges and universities, meanwhile, will continue raising the tuition 
they charge until they are effectively offering the same terms as 
nonprofit and proprietary institutions, and will come increasingly to 
resemble private nonprofits- more like the University of 
Pennsylvania than the University of California. 
Conclusion 
In the early 1970s, it was reasonable to expect that the future 
would bring increasing socialization of both health care and higher 
education in the United States. In health care, it seemed likely that 
insurance covering both physician and hospital care would be largely 
nationalized. Although hospitals might remain largely private 
nonprofit or local governmental institutions, their performance, and 
that of individual physicians, would effectively be governed by the 
incentives created by the national insurance scheme. In higher 
education, state and local universities and colleges would continue to 
expand their domination not just in terms of market share, but also 
in terms of quality. After all, the University of California at Berkeley 
had become the finest university in the world. Private nonprofit 
colleges and universities would continue to serve a generally 
prosperous elite seeking an education accompanied with substantial 
amenities, but would become increasingly marginal for higher 
education as a whole. 
Of course, it hasn't worked out that way. Health care took a 
strong turn toward capitalism, with large investor-owned 
corporations rapidly expanding their presence in hospital care, 
health insurance, and physician practices (via for-profit health 
maintenance organizations). Higher education has moved more 
slowly in this respect, but the pace seems to be increasing. The public 
presence in the industry is retreating, the proprietary presence is 
expanding, and both public and nonprofit institutions are coming 
increasingly to resemble proprietary firms as public institutions 
charge ever higher tuition and the nonprofit institutions centralize 
authority and treat faculty more and more like ordinary employees. 
In the long run, in fact, it seems reasonable to expect that the 
market will play a much larger role in higher education than it will in 
93 See Henry Hansmann, Why Do Universities Have Endowments ?, 19 J Legal Stud 3, 4, 
13, 39-40 (1990). 
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health care. Individuals need insurance against bad health, but it is 
not obvious that there is any effective way to provide efficient health 
insurance in a competitive market. An effective health insurance 
policy should presumably be lifelong, but the rate of change in health 
care is so great that it is difficult to write an efficient contract for 
even a year or two. Government may for now be able to force the 
construction of subnational pools for which private insurers can bid, 
but with high residential and employment mobility it seems quite 
possible that this approach will ultimately fail and full nationalization 
of health insurance will be required, leaving it to the national 
government rather than the market to make basic decisions about 
the type of health care to be provided, and its distribution across the 
society. 
Higher education, meanwhile, seems to be going in the reverse 
direction. The unit of consumption will probably continue to shrink, 
as students increasingly shop across institutions for individual 
courses rather than looking for a single vendor of a four-year 
experience. And online learning should expand radically the range of 
institutions and courses available. The national government will play 
an increasing role in financing, which will come largely on the 
demand side through relatively unrestricted grants and loans to 
students that are tenable at well-regulated proprietary schools as 
well as at nonprofit and public institutions. Subject to this broad 
subsidy, market forces will continue to determine the quantity and 
character of education provided. Proprietary institutions will come to 
dominate the lower end of the education market and will make 
inroads in the top end as well, while public colleges and universities 
retreat relatively rapidly and nonprofit institutions retreat rather 
more slowly. 
Capitalist higher education may be a bit unnerving for some of 
us. I've spent most of my life teaching at an institution whose neo- 
Gothic architecture makes it look very much like a monastery. It 
even has a cloister in the courtyard. For the present, that appearance 
isn't entirely misleading as to the atmosphere within. But after a few 
more decades the architecture may be the only remnant of medieval 
higher education that survives. 
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* Degree-credit enrollment only. 
Source: National Center for Education Statistics, Digest ofEducation Statistics: 
Total Fall Enrollment in Degree-Granting I stitutions, by Attendance Status ,Sex 
of Student, andControl of Institution: Selected Years, 1947 through 2009 (2010), 
online athttp://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/dl0/tables/dtl0_197.asp (visited Jan 
15,2012). 
Table 1. Enrollment in Degree-Granting Institutions by 
Ownership Form, 1949-2009 
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